Demonstrate the differences and errors of the intelligence analysis Research Paper

Demonstrate the differences and errors of the knowledge analysis product mingled with Pearl Harbor vs. Iraq War based on the cognitive biases and perceptions of the Intelligence analysts - Research Paper poserBecause this was the assumption, all of the evidence supporting this assumption was used to fit the prevailing wisdom. In both cases, real powerful psychological biases were at work confirmation bias, and the closely related phenomenon, tunnel vision and mind-set. exactly put, evidence that supports a bias is used, evidence not supporting it is ignored or discarded. There is fat evidence that this was the case in both Iraq and Pearl Harbor. This paper will explain the different biases, and appearing how both Pearl Harbor and Iraq fit these biases perfectly.There are a number of reasons why, all of them human, that intelligence analysts may have a hard time properly interpreting data. All of the reasons are focused upon data immersion. (Heuer, 1999, pp. 40-41). When info rmation comes into the intelligence analyst, this information comes in as discrete pieces of data. This data must be put into some kind of meaningful context, so the data must be sorted, selected and organized so that it becomes something that is meaningful to the analyst. However, the data can be sorted and analyzed in a way that would already confirm an inherent bias, or so that it confirms a notion that has already been preconceived. There are abundant many biases that humans capability have, and the intelligence is used to support these biases. The following are some of the biases that might occur.For instance, humans might submit to what is known as a confirmation bias. This means that the facts that are plan of attack in are interpreted in such a way that they confirm existing beliefs. At the same time, the information that is coming in that refutes these existing beliefs is discounted (Ask and Granhag, 2005, p. 45). This may also be known as tunnel vision. In tunnel vision , just like with the confirmation bias, the intelligence analyst focuses upon a hypothesis that there are weapons of